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Recently, the Ninth Circuit decided JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Props. Inc., et al. (In re Transwest Resort Props. Inc.), Case No. 16-16221, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 1947 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018)(“In re Transwest“). Prior to this case, there was a significant split in the lower courts between the “per plan” or “per debtor” impaired accepting class requirement to the confirmation of chapter 11 plans of reorganization. The Ninth Circuit was the first Circuit court to render a decision on this issue.

If this decision is adopted by other Circuit courts it may have a significant effect on cram downs involving multiple debtors with a joint plan. As a result of In re Transwest, debtors may cram their plan down on all creditors based on a single impaired accepting class, including those situations where the impaired accepting class has claims against different debtors than the class crammed down.

In re Transwest involved five (5) debtors and a corporate structure of a holding company that was the sole equity owner of two mezzanine debtors, which were the sole equity owners of two operating debtors in the resort business.  The resorts were encumbered by a $209 million loan to the operating debtors (the “Operating Loan”), as well as a $21.5 million loan secured by the mezzanine debtors’ equity interests in the operating debtors (the “Mezzanine Loan”).

The debtors’ plan provided for (a) a sale of the operating debtors for $30 million, which would thereby extinguish the mezzanine debtors’ ownership interest in the operating debtors; (b) a restructuring of the Operating Loan to a 21-year note with a principal amount of $247 million, interest payments due and payable monthly, and (c) no recovery for the Mezzanine Loan claimants.

The holders of the Mezzanine Loan claims objected to confirmation of the plan, which was nonetheless confirmed because there were other impaired, accepting creditor classes with claims against the operating debtors.  The bankruptcy court adopted the “per plan” approach and held that it could confirm the plan despite the fact there was no impaired accepting creditor class for the mezzanine debtors.  On appeal, the district court also applied the “per plan” approach, thus affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision.

Upon analysis of the plain language of section 1129(a)(10) that one impaired class “under the plan” approve “the plan,” the Ninth Circuit found that the plain language of the statute supports the “per plan” approach as it makes no distinction concerning the creditors of different debtors under “the plan,” nor does it distinguish between single-debtor and multi-debtor plans.

Section 102(7), a rule of statutory construction, provides that “the singular includes the plural.” Because of this provision, the mezzanine lenders argued that section 102(7) required that section 1129(a)(10) apply on a “per debtor” basis. Not only did the Court find that the “per plan” approach is consistent with this interpretation, the Court then found no support for the position that all subsections must uniformly apply on a “per debtor” basis, especially when each subsection of the Bankruptcy Code is phrased differently. Section 102(7) effectively amends section 1129(a)(10) to read: “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plans has accepted the plans.”

Some experts question whether the “per plan” approach is a form of substantive consolidation that is inappropriate and unfair in certain circumstances.  The opinion is significant because it is the first Circuit Court ruling on the “per plan” versus “per debtor” issue.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

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On May 25, 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) goes into effect. The GDPR is a piece of legislation passed by European lawmakers to create a uniform data privacy law across all member states of the European Union (EU).

The purpose of the GDPR is to:

  • support privacy as a fundamental human right;
  • require companies to be accountable for managing personal data; and
  • grant individuals rights in how their personal data is used and processed.

Under the GDPR, personal data is defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.” This includes name, address, email address, financial information, contact information, and identification numbers. It also includes digital information such as an IP address, browsing history, geolocation, cookies, or other digital identifiers. It may also include information about an individual’s physical, mental, social, economic or cultural identity. To sum, any information that may be traced or related to an identifiable person is more than likely “personal data” under the GDPR.

Although such rights are not absolute, the GDPR grants several rights to individuals, including:

  • Access: Individuals may request a copy of any personal data retained by a controller or processor of personal data as well as an explanation of its usage.
  • Rectification: Individuals have the right to correct, revise or remove any retained personal data at any time.
  • Deletion: Individuals may request a party to delete their personal data.
  • Restriction of processing: individuals may request limited use of their personal data if they believe that their personal data is inaccurate or has been collected illegally.
  • Portability: Individuals have the right to receive their personal data in a commonly-used, structured, and machine-readable format.
  • Objection: At any time, individuals may opt out of the use of their personal data if they no longer desire to permit their personal data to be included in analytics or to receive direct marketing emails or other personalized, targeted marketing content.

Pursuant to the GDPR, two types of parties have a responsibility when handling data, the “controller” and the “processor.” A “controller” determines the purposes and means of the use of personal data. In contrast, a “processor” acts solely on behalf of and pursuant to the instructions of the “controller” in processing personal data. Business entities affected by the GDPR must determine whether they are acting as a controller or a processor and understand their corresponding responsibilities.

The GDPR applies both to organizations located within the European Union and organizations located outside of the EU if they offer goods or services to, or monitor the behavior of, EU data subjects. The GDPR applies to all companies possessing and processing the personal data of data subjects residing in the European Union, regardless of the company’s location.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

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At the end of February, the United States Supreme Court decided Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., a decision with perhaps far-reaching implications affecting a broad range of business transactions, especially leveraged stock deals. The Court’s decision in affirming a 2016 decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, effectively overruled conflicting decisions from the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits.

The Merit Management decision involved a $55 million purchase by Valley View Downs of all of the outstanding stock of BDMC, owned in part (30%) by Merit Management. Later, Valley View filed for bankruptcy relief. Title 11 – the Bankruptcy Code – grants bankruptcy trustees certain avoidance powers, allowing them to set aside and recover certain transfers for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, including certain fraudulent transfers “of an interest of the debtor in property.”

Section 546(e) of Title 11 places various limits on the exercise of these avoidance powers, including a “safe harbor” which provides that a “trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a … settlement payment … made by or to (or for the benefit of) a … financial institution .. or that is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a … financial institution … in connection with a securities contract.”

In an exercise of these avoidance powers, Valley View’s bankruptcy estate sued Merit Management, alleging that Valley View had “substantially overpaid” for the BDMC stock and attempting to claw back Merit Management’s share of the purchase price. Bankruptcy trustees and debtors can increase the amount of money available to creditors in a bankruptcy case by “clawing back” funds transferred by the debtor to another party. Several sections of Title 11, §§ 547, 548(a)(1), and 544, grant the debtor or trustee powers to effectuate the clawback of transfers. Section 546(e), known as the “safe-harbor” provision, limits most of these claw back powers by barring the avoidance of certain transfers.

Here, the purchase was financed by Credit Suisse, and Citizens Bank served as escrow agent. At Valley View’s direction, Credit Suisse wired its loan proceeds directly to Citizens Bank which, upon receiving selling shareholders’ stock, closed the transaction and distributed 30% of the total purchase price to Merit Management. Merit Management argued that the payment could not be avoided because the transfers from Credit Suisse to Citizens Bank and from Citizens Bank to Merit Management were transfers “by or to” a financial institution.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that the relevant transfer for the purposes of determining any “safe harbor” is the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid, in this case, from Valley View to Merit Management, not any of the intermediate transfers that comprised such transfer. Therefore, the payment by Valley View to Merit Management was not protected, and the facilitating transfers by Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank were irrelevant. For now, the Merit Management decision seems to substantially narrow the 546(e) safe harbor for bankruptcy debtors.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

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A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case decided in March 2018, considered a question of first impression. The case, PSM Holding Corp. v. National Farm Financial Corporation et al, (15-55026, March 7, 2018) (“PSM” and “National Farm”) considered whether a judgment creditor, who seizes a judgment debtor’s company pursuant to a judgment that is subsequently reversed on appeal, may recover in restitution for losses suffered while it was in possession of the seized company. The district court that heard the case answered affirmatively and awarded PSM Holding Corp. over $1.1 million in restitution. The parties then filed five appeals and cross-appeals.

The parties involved had attempted to complete a transaction whereby National Farm would sell an entity known as Business Alliance Insurance Company (“BAIC”) to PSM. BAIC provided insurance to small businesses and had approximately $30 million of assets. Ultimately, National Farm withdrew from the sale which resulted in PSM suing National Farm, Larry Chao (the president of National Farm), and BAIC alleging claims for breach of contract and fraud.

After a trial, a jury found for PSM and awarded it $43 million for both claims. Defendants were to post a $40 million bond as a condition to staying execution of the judgment pending appeal. When the Defendants failed to do so and National Farm entered bankruptcy, PSM executed on the judgment and took control of BAIC.

After taking possession of BAIC, PSM attempted to integrate it into its business. The Ninth Circuit then reversed the district court’s denial of Defendants motion for judgment as a matter of law. With this reversal, it was undisputed that PSM would owe Defendants restitution. At issue, was the appropriate amount of restitution. After the parties negotiated and haggled about who owed what to whom, the district court decided that the Defendants, who were judgment debtors, would pay restitution to PSM for losses it suffered while it possessed BAIC.

The Appeals Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part. It held that a wrongful seizure could result in restitution, affirming the right to restitution, but finding error in allowing the recovery, rejecting challenges to an order denying the creditor’s request for rescission of its quota share reinsurance agreement. It decided the crux of the restitution issue by holding that any right to restitution runs only to the judgment debtor.

Thus, a judgment creditor who seizes a judgment debtor’s company pursuant to a judgment that is subsequently reversed on appeal cannot recover in restitution for losses suffered while it was in possession of the seized company.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

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In the late ’90s, Many states, including California, passed the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), which allowed public and private sectors to use both electronic and digital signatures. California had already enacted a law that regulated the use of “digital signatures” for government transactions. Until Assembly bill 2296 in 2016 expediently solved the problem allowing California government agencies to use electronic records, the laws conflicted.

With the introduction of Assembly Bill 2658 earlier in 2018, Ian Calderon (D-Whittier) is attempting to further streamline the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. Calderon is trying to update California’s version of UETA with particular revisions, including amendments of terms such as:

  • electronic record
  • electronic signature
  • contract
  • electronic contract
  • smart contract

The definition of “electronic” record and “electronic signature” would be expanded to encompass those secured via the blockchain. The legal definition of “contract” would be expanded to encompass a smart contract.

Of equal significance is the legislation’s recognition, consideration, and definition of blockchain technology, which is another method by which a record or signature may be secured. Under AB 2658’s revisions, data ownership or use would extend to someone performing interstate or foreign commerce on the blockchain in California “with respect to that information as before the person secured the information using blockchain technology.”

AB 2658 defines “blockchain technology” as

“distributed ledger technology that uses a distributed, decentralized, shared, and reciprocal ledger, that may be public or private, permissioned or permissionless, or driven by tokenized crypto economics or tokenless. The data on the ledger is protected with cryptography, is immutable, is auditable, and provides an uncensored truth.”

AB 2658 seeks to amend the Electronic Transactions Act that specifies a record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form and that a contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

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Obtaining Relief From The Automatic Stay

If they meet the necessary requirements, creditors may obtain relief from the automatic stay by filing a motion under § 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which initiates a contested matter before the bankruptcy court. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition and commencement of a bankruptcy thereby, these automatic stay provisions enjoin most types of collection activities and other creditor actions against the debtor and its assets.

The automatic stay applies to all of the chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. It does not protect nondebtor entities such as corporate affiliates, corporate officers, codefendants, guarantors, or general partners of the debtor. Whether a creditor’s particular action is subject to the automatic stay often depends on whether the claim arose before or after the filing of the bankruptcy case.

In Chapter 7 cases, Creditors may obtain relief from the automatic stay pursuant to § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code upon a showing that there is no equity (the value of the property less all encumbrances) in the property. In Chapter 13 cases, Creditors may obtain relief from the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code upon a showing that there is no equity in the property and such property is unnecessary to the debtor’s effective reorganization.

For a creditor to satisfy the first requirement, the value of the property may not exceed the amount of all debts secured by liens on the property. To meet the second requirement, a creditor must show that an effective reorganization may occur without the property or that the debtor is unlikely to successfully reorganize within a reasonable time.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

 

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April Amendments Change SB 1235 As Proposed

On April 9, 2018, significant changes were made to SB 1235 (Steve Glazer, D-Sacramento), which was introduced in the California State Senate on February 15th. If passed in its original form, the language of the Bill would have required disclosure of interest rates and imposed other regulations for commercial loans.

Presently, California law has never required interest rate disclosures for commercial loans and many industry experts believe that the bill, as proposed, would have significantly affected California’s commercial lending industry. As a result, many spoke out, lobbied against the bill in its original form, and, in response, the California Senate revised important language of the bill on April 9, 2018.

Both the February and April versions contain the following regarding to whom the Bill may apply:

The bill would provide that the provisions of this bill apply to a provider who consummates or arranges more than 5 commercial financing transactions during a calendar year to a recipient. The bill would specifically provide that the provisions of this bill do not apply to a provider who is a depository institution, which this bill would define to include specified state and federal financial institutions.

Thus, the bill applies to providers who make five or more loans a year but does not apply to depositary institutions.

Both versions of the Bill contain the following prohibition against finance lending without a license while defining a finance lender. However, the newly-amended version of SB 1235 deleted the following important provision related to liability: “A willful violation of the CFL is a crime except as specified.”

Existing law, the California Financing Law (CFL), provides for the licensure and regulation of finance lenders and brokers and, beginning on January 1, 2019, program administrators, by the Commissioner of Business Oversight. The CFL prohibits anyone from engaging in the business of a finance lender or broker without obtaining a license. Existing law defines a finance lender as any person who is engaged in making consumer loans or commercial loans, as defined. The CFL prohibits a licensee from making a materially false or misleading statement to a borrower about the terms or conditions of a loan.

SB 1235 as originally proposed read as follows:

“This bill would require any person who engages in the business of commercial financing to, at the time of offering the commercial financing provide to the prospective borrower a written statement showing in clear and distinct terms specified information regarding that transaction, including the total amount of fees, the amount provided, the APR related to that transaction, and policies regarding repayment or prepayment that apply to that transaction. The bill would require that disclosure to be signed by all parties to the transaction, and to meet certain requirements, such as that it must be in writing using a specified font size, made in the same language used in discussions, or negotiations related to that transaction, and not be vague or misleading.

The bill would define the term “commercial financing” for these purposes to mean a commercial loan, accounts receivable financing or factoring, a cash advance to a business, or a line of credit. By expanding the scope of an existing crime with respect to willful violations of the CFL, this bill would impose a state mandated local program.”

The new version of SB 1235 omits the provision related to the loan’s average percentage rate of interest (APR). The bill also eliminates the last paragraph defining the term “commercial financing.” Instead, it defines it as “… an accounts receivable purchase transaction, commercial loan, or commercial open-end credit plan intended by the recipient for use primarily for other than personal, family, or household purposes.”

After the April changes, the Bill now reads:

This bill would require a provider who facilitates commercial financing to a recipient, as defined, to disclose specified information relating to that transaction to the recipient at the time of extending a specific offer of commercial financing, and to obtain the recipient’s signature on that disclosure before consummating the commercial financing transaction. The bill would require that disclosure to include specified information, including the total amount of funds provided, information related to the payments to be made, and the total dollar cost of the financing.

SB 1235 defines a “provider” as “… a person who facilitates commercial financing to a recipient. “Provider” includes a person who is facilitating an offer of commercial financing in partnership with a depository institution.” Most importantly, the new April amendments delete the provisions related to disclosure of total fees and a commercial loan’s rate of interest. Instead, it requires disclosure of “specified” information, the total amount of funds provided, and the total dollar cost of the financing.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

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Recordkeeping Requirements Under The CRMLA And CFLL, Part 2

This is the second part of an article on the requirements imposed by the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA) and the California Finance Lenders Law (CFLL) regarding recordkeeping by licensees. Both acts impose certain requirements on licensees, who must keep all of the following types of records:

*Mortgage Application Data. Licensees must maintain the following information for each mortgage loan application:

  • Loan application;
  • Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement;
  • Appraisal report;
  • Adverse action or rejection of application letter;
  • Loan commitment;
  • Loan closing statement;
  • Copies of the promissory note and deed of trust;
  • Credit report. (10 CCR §1950.314.4(b))

*Books and Records. Licensees must retain the following records:

  • Both general and expense ledgers;
  • Both general and cash journals;
  • Any other records of cash receipts and disbursements;
  • Monthly financial reports;
  • Borrowers’ ledger cards reduced to a zero balance.

*Closed loans:

  • The original initial loan application;
  • The appraisal, credit report, and other third-party documents;
  • The closing statement and escrow instructions;
  • Copies of all documents signed by the customer;
  • All other related miscellaneous loan documents. (10 CCR §1950.314.4(d))

The CFLL contains minimal instructions about the records that licensees must maintain and include the following (note that additional requirements apply when a loan is sold, transferred, or assigned to a different company):

  • Loan application;
  • The statement of the loan or other disclosure statements used for legal compliance;
  • Promissory note;
  • Security agreement or wage assignment;
  • Payment record;
  • Escrow closing statement, if applicable;
  • Insurance policies, if applicable.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

 

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Recordkeeping Requirements Under The CRMLA And CFLL, Part 1

A mortgage loan originator, defined as any individual who offers or negotiates terms of a residential mortgage loan for the expectation of compensation or gain, must be licensed to operate in California. The California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA) and the California Finance Lenders Law (CFLL) impose certain recordkeeping requirements on licensees.

CRMLA licensees must keep the following current:

*General Account Records:

  • General ledger reflecting the assets, liabilities, capital, income, and expenses of the business. The bank accounts in the general ledger must be reconciled at least once each month using bank statements of the general accounts.
  • Cash receipts and disbursement journal. (10 CCR §1950.314.2).

*Trust Accounts. With regard to trust accounts, licensees are required to maintain the following:

  • Trust account ledger card for each account, listing all receipts and disbursement of all funds deposited by the borrower, lender, or seller related to the origination, closing, or servicing of a loan. This record must be reconciled at least weekly using the liability controlling account.
  • Cash receipt and disbursement journal. This record must be reconciled at least monthly.
  • Copies of all receipts and checks. This record must be reconciled at least monthly.
  • Liability controlling account. (10 CCR §1950.314.1(a))

*Loan Log. Licensees must maintain a log which contains the following information for each loan application they receive:

  • Name of the borrower;
  • Address of property;
  • Date of application;
  • Loan amount, terms;
  • Loan officer;
  • Loan program;
  • If the loan is closed, disposition of the loan and servicing. (10 CCR §1950.314.4(a))

Stay tuned to the second part of this article for more California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA) and the California Finance Lenders Law (CFLL) recordkeeping requirements.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

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Grounds for Denying An FLL Or RMLA License

Under California law, a mortgage loan originator is any individual who offers or negotiates terms of a residential mortgage loan for the expectation of compensation or gain. Any person who provides services as a mortgage loan originator under the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA) or the California Finance Lenders Law (CFLL) must be employed by and sponsored by a Department of Business Oversight (DBO) licensee under the CRMLA or CFLL. Perhaps more importantly, a mortgage loan originator must herself be licensed to operate in California. What are the reasons an applicant may be denied a license under the CRMLA or CFLL?

Decisions on license applications must be issued by the Commissioner within 60 days of the receipt of a complete application. For applications that are incomplete or insufficient, the applicant must respond to the Commissioner’s notice of application deficiencies within 90 days. If the applicant fails to respond, the Commissioner will consider the application to be withdrawn (Cal. Fin. Code §§22109(b), (c); 50126(b), (c)).

The Commissioner of the California DBO may deny a Finance Lenders Law license application or a Residential Mortgage Lending Act license application for any of the following reasons:

  • A false statement of material fact has been made in the application;
  • In relation to the person’s duties, an officer, director, general partner, or person with a 10% or greater interest in the company has, within the last ten years: or been convicted of, or pled no contest to, a crime, or committed an act of fraud, dishonesty, or deceit;
  • The applicant or an officer, director, general partner, or person with a 10% or greater interest in the company has violated any provisions of California law or regulations;
  • The applicant employs a mortgage loan originator who is not licensed unless the mortgage loan originator is exempt. (Cal. Fin. Code §§22109; 50126)

Also, the application for a residential mortgage lender or servicer license may be denied if any of the following apply:

  • The applicant is not in material compliance with a provision of the Residential Mortgage Lending Act, or an order or rule of the Commissioner;
  • The Commissioner cannot determine that the applicant or a partner, member, principal officer, or director has shown adequate financial and ethical responsibility, experience, character, and general fitness;
  • A material requirement for licensure has not been met. (Cal. Fin. Code §50125)

Noteworthy is that an application may be denied if the applicant employs an unlicensed mortgage loan originator. Also, apparently the Commissioner has the discretion to determine whether an applicant has sufficiently demonstrated qualities of character and fitness.

The attorneys at Glass & Goldberg in California provide high quality, cost-effective legal services, and advice for clients in all aspects of commercial compliance, business litigation, and transactional law. Call us at (818) 888-2220, send an email inquiry to info@glassgoldberg.com or visit us online at glassgoldberg.com to learn more about the firm and to sign up for future newsletters.

 

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